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This paper studies loan activity in a context where banks must follow Basel Accord-type rules 
and acquire financing from households. Loan activity typically decreases when entrepreneurs’ 
investment returns decline, and we study which type of policy could revigorate an economy in 
a trough. We find that active monetary policy increases loan volume even when the economy 
is in good shape; introducing active capital requirement policy can be effective as well if it 
implies tightening of regulation in bad times. This is performed with an heterogeneous agent 
economy with occupational choice, financial  intermediation and aggregate shocks to the 
distribution of entrepreneurial returns. 
JEL-Code: E440, E220, G280, E580. 
Keywords: bank capital channel, capital requirements, Basel Accord, occupational choice, 




   
 
Martin Berka 
School of Economics and Finance 
Victoria University of Wellington 
P.O. Box 600 




Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
P.O. Box 442 
USA – St. Louis MO 63166-0442 
zimmermann@stlouisfed.org 
   
 
December 23, 2011 
This work was initiated while both authors were visiting the Bank of Canada and benefited 
from initial stimulus from Mingwei Yuan and discussions with Scott Hendry, Césaire Meh, 
Kevin Moran, Vincenzo Quadrini, and seminar participants at the Universities of Alabama, 
Connecticut, Florida International, Montréal, Boston College, the Dallas and St. Louis Fed, 
the national Bank of Poland, the NBER Summer Institute, and the Midwest Macro Meetings 
at  the Chicago Fed. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. No 
responsibility should be attributed to the Bank of Canada. The views expressed are those of 
the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. Any errors or 
omissions are those of the authors. 1 Introduction
Traditionally, the literature on ﬁnancial intermediation and credit channels, especial-
ly credit crunches, has emphasized the relation between banks and entrepreneurs who
require credit and has neglected the funding of banks. With this paper, we want to be
much more precise in this respect and study the impact of funding on credit. Indeed,
the world wide capital adequacy requirements imposed by the Basel Accords limit the
amount of bank loans by the level of bank equity. A crucial and yet under-explored
element we focus on in the model is the dependance of the amount of equity banks can
issue on the supply of equity by households (who also purchase deposits).
In our model economy, households have heterogenous asset holdings because of dif-
ferent labor histories and because only some of them qualify to apply for credit as
entrepreneurs. (among those, the return on investment is stochastic.) Non-entrepreneur
households invest in bank deposits and bank equity, and banks maximize proﬁts while
following regulations. A central bank conducts the monetary policy and regulates the
banks.
Therefore, when banks reduce their loan portfolio, the displaced entrepreneurs also
become new equity holders, thereby acting as “automatic stabilizers.” However, banks
typically reduce their quantity of loans when their loan portfolio becomes too risky, and
households may then want to hold less equity in banks that are now more risky. Whether
or not banks have to severely tighten credit in this situation depends very much on the
distribution of assets across households and their equity decisions.
We solve this very rich model using numerical methods, in particular for the transi-
tional dynamics that may lead an economy into a possible credit crunch. We then look
for policies that may help the economy out of a trough or prevent it altogether. We ﬁnd
that the endogenous distribution of assets has strong implications that should not be
neglected in future research. Also, monetary policy can have positive real eﬀects only if
the central bank is able to commit to act in certain ways.
We ﬁnd some evidence in our model that a credit crunch can arise in the presence of
capital requirements, as documented in the data by Bernanke and Lown (1991).1 The
numerical simulations show that the size of the crunch is relatively small. We then in-
vestigate the potential role of ﬂexible capital requirements. One would ﬁrst think that
loosening those requirements in a trough would expand the loan mass. It appears that,
on the contrary, tighter capital requirements increase the demand for equity, and thus
facilitate the ﬁnancing of banks suﬃciently to oﬀset the reduction of allowable loans for
given equity. Again, this highlights the importance of the savings decisions for the sup-
ply of bank capital. This result is particularly important in the light of the second Basel
Accord, whose more ﬂexible requirements essentially tighten the equity requirements
when the economy passes through a rough patch, as highlighted by Catarineu-Rabell,
Jackson and Tsomocos (2005). This cyclicality of capital requirements was previously
1The welfare costs of bank capital requirements, notwithstanding the possible costs of a credit crunch,
are studied by Van den Heuvel (2008).
1thought to have a negative impact on credit. For example, Kashyap and Stein (2004)
argue that Basel II exacerbates business cycle ﬂuctuations by requiring banks to hold
more capital during downturns. Higher costs of raising capital in downturns force banks
to further contract lending, a credit crunch. However, such demand-side arguments
ignores the negative impact of declining capital adequacy on the supply of bank cap-
ital. Rising funding costs in bad times are partly a result of a drop in the supply of
bank’s capital because of the banks’ deteriorating capitalization. Our model articulates
both of the channels. Under standard calibration, the supply-side channel in our model
dominates the demand considerations highlighted in Kashyap and Stein (2004). Con-
sequently, more stringent capital adequacy requirements help bank recapitalization and
facilitate a smoother loan time-path. The conservative lending behavior implied by such
a policy in the face of increased aggregate uncertainty has been observed in the data –
for example by Baum, Caglayan, and Ozkan (2002).
We are not the ﬁrst to highlight the real impact of monetary policy through lending.
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) highlight two channels. In the balance sheet channel, Fed
policy aﬀects the ﬁnancial position of borrowers and hence their ability to post collateral
or self-ﬁnance. In the bank lending channel, Fed policy shifts the supply of bank credit,
in particular loans.2 They argue the importance of the latter channel has declined with
deregulation, as this channel relies on reserves. Van de Heuvel (2002) identiﬁes another
channel stemming speciﬁcally from Basel Accord-like rules. The “bank capital channel”
arises from maturity transformation through banks: higher short-term interest rates
depress proﬁts and consequently equity and capital adequacy – all this in an environment
with an imperfect market for bank equity, which forces banks to raise new equity by
retaining their earnings. Van de Heuvel’s model has a very detailed banking structure,
but neglects the problems of households and ﬁrms. Our model has a simpler banking
structure but emphasizes the source of ﬁnancing (households) and the demand for loans
(entrepreneurs) by modeling occupational choice, savings, and bankruptcy.3
Chami and Cosimano (2010) identify a “bank-balance sheet channel” using the con-
cept of increasing marginal cost of external ﬁnancing. Oligopolistic banks avoid expected
proﬁt declines caused by the anticipation of a binding capital adequacy constraint by
holding capital above the regulatory level. Tighter monetary policy raises banks’ cost of
funding and reduces loan supply. Persistent increases in deposit rates reduce the option
value of bank capital, further propagating the loan contraction. As in Van den Heuvel
(2002), these authors need market power in the banking industry to obtain the result.
Our model has fully competitive banks. Furthermore, they summarize the demands for
loans with a reduced form while we try to present a general equilibrium framework.
Bolton and Freixas (2006) have a model where higher costliness of bank capital, due to
asymmetric information about the quality of banks’ assets, motivates banks to hold the
2The empirical relevance of the standard bank lending channel has recently been questioned by den
Haan et al. (2007), who document large loan portfolio changes following monetary contractions.
3The heterogeneity of ﬁrms we obtain is endogenous. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) also
have heterogeneous ﬁrms, but they exogenously ﬁx a share of ﬁrms to have easy access to credit.
2minimum required amount of capital. Capital requirements are a cause of the credit
crunch when spreads are low – one of model’s multiple equilibria. Monetary policy
tightening operates by pricing riskier ﬁrms out of the loan market. Our model puts
more emphasis on the ﬁnancing side and does not impose the asymmetric information
assumption. In a model where banks as well as entrepreneurs face moral hazard, Meh
and Moran (2004) show that responses to monetary and technology shocks are damp-
ened but more persistent. The bank capital/asset ratio in their model is countercyclical,
as in the data, but the authors do not explore the behavior of credit.4 The discussion
of cyclicality of capital requirements has intensiﬁed recently. Covas and Fujita (2010)
extend Kato’s (2006) model of liquidity provision under asymmetric information with
bank capital requirements. They ﬁnd that Basel-II type cyclical capital requirements
reduce household welfare by increasing output volatility. In the overlapping generations
framework of Repullo and Suarez (2009), banks cannot access equity markets every pe-
riod and consequently hold large capital buﬀers. Buﬀers are insuﬃcient to prevent credit
contractions in downturns. In a static partial equilibrium model, Heid (2007) shows that
capital buﬀers held by banks in excess of the Basel II requirements strongly inﬂuence
the degree of cyclical magniﬁcation of the business cycle.
Gertler and Karadi (2011) model agency problems at the bank level as the cause of
diﬃculties in raising capital in a model with heterogeneity within a family in a represen-
tative agent framework. They highlight that a non-standard monetary policy, whereby
the central bank intermediates in a crisis, reduces the credit volume downturns as a result
of the elimination of the agency problem (but at a cost of lower eﬃciency). Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) combine the aforementioned model with Kiyotaoki and Moore’s (2008)
model of liquidity risk. A contraction limits the intermediary’s ability to obtain credit,
driving a wedge between the loan and deposit rates that constrains the non-ﬁnancial
borrowers. In our model, counter-cyclical loan-deposit spreads and bank funding dif-
ﬁculties in the downturn arise without any informational asymmetries. Christensen et
al. (2011) introduces the double hazard problem of Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1997) into a
New-Keynesian environment and ﬁnd that higher capital requirements lead too increased
monitoring of borrowers. As a consequence, countercyclical capital requirements damp-
ens ﬂuctuations and improves welfare.
The major points of diﬀerence of our model are with the endogenous ﬁnancing of
bank and heterogeneity of agents. Loan applicants are endogenously divided into en-
trepreneurs and depositors according to their wealth. Not only are the loan supply
and demand endogenous, changes in macroeconomic conditions generate distributional
eﬀects that feed back to the aggregate level in a general equilibrium setting. Because
of these distributional considerations, Basel-II type requirements do not magnify the
downturns, unlike in all other work discussed above. In fact, ours is the ﬁrst model
4Regulations in many countries limit or prevent banks from investing equity (capital) in their bor-
rowers’ business, arguably to limit their risk exposure. However, contribution of the model in Meh and
Moran (2004) is based on the assumption which implies that banks invest a share of their capital into
borrowers’ business.
3in which tightening of the capital adequacy requirements in bad times facilitates bank
funding, by lowering risk of bank equity and making it more attractive to savers. In fact,
as households anticipate this, they provide more equity to banks even when the econ-
omy is doing well, leading to an improvement in steady-state as well. This is consistent
with evidence from Guidara et al. (2010) that shows Canadian banks’ capital was more
procyclical after the implementation of Basel II.
Credit constraints in our model lead to asymmetric eﬀects of the monetary policy,
with tightening having more signiﬁcant real consequences than a monetary policy loos-
ening (one of the key properties of monetary propagation mechanism in general, as
highlighted by Kocherlakota, 2000). Furthermore, our model is the only one so far that
can be used for addressing both the aggregate eﬀects and the redistributional eﬀects of
credit market policies.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 presents the calibration of the model. Section 4 analyzes bank lending and optimal
monetary policy behavior following negative shocks. Section 5 concludes. Appendices
give additional details about various aspects of the model and the solution strategy.
2 Model
2.1 Overview
There are three types of agents in the economy: households, banks, and a central bank.
Households in a productive stage of their lives aim to become entrepreneurs, but a short-
age of internal ﬁnancing forces them to apply for external funds. Successful applicants
become entrepreneurs while others become workers. Worker face an idiosyncratic shock
of becoming unemployed while entrepreneurs face risky returns on their investment.5 All
households in a productive stage of life (entrepreneurs, and employed and unemployed
workers) face a risk of becoming permanently retired, and all retirees face a risk of dying.
New households are born to replace the deceased ones.
When households make their consumption-saving decision, they decide optimally
on allocation of their savings between bank deposits and bank equity. Banks collect
deposits and equity, provide loans to entrepreneurs and purchase risk-free government
bonds in order to maximize their proﬁts. Banks screen loan applications and accept
them according to the level of each household’s net worth. Banks also have to purchase
deposit insurance and are subject to a capital adequacy requirement imposed by the
central bank. The central bank controls the government bond rate.
We now go through the model in more detail. The economy is subject to aggregate
shocks and can thus be represented by an aggregate state vector including the current
shock and the current distribution of assets and occupations that we ignore to simplify
5Empirically, such earnings shocks are critical for the savings decisions, as outlined in the 2001
Survey of Consumer Finances (Chatterjee et al. (2007)).
4notation.
2.2 Households
In the model economy, there is a continuum of measure one of households, each maxi-
mizing their expected discounted lifetime utility by choosing an optimal consumption-
savings path. A household can either be productive or retired, and the probability of a
productive household retiring τ is exogenous.6
Each productive household i is endowed with one investment project of size xi, which
is always greater than the household’s net worth mi. We assume that the total invest-
ment is a ﬁxed multiple of household’s net worth: xi = φmi, where φ > 1. The project
is indivisible, and so (φ − 1)mi has to be funded by the bank in order for a project to
be undertaken.7 If a household receives a loan it becomes an entrepreneur and invests
in a project, receiving a return ri drawn from a trinomial distribution. The distribu-
tion of returns is such that households always prefer investing in projects and becoming
entrepreneurs to becoming workers. We study an equilibrium in which this participa-
tion constraint is satisﬁed in all cases for households that receive loans. The returns are
drawn independently across households and time. The lowest of the returns is suﬃciently
negative with a positive probability to lead to bankruptcy, in which case a household
is guaranteed a minimal amount of consumption cmin and starts next period with no
assets.8
When the bank rejects a loan application, the household enters the work force and
faces exogenous probabilities 1 − u of becoming employed and u of becoming unem-
ployed. Workers inelastically supply their labor and receive an after tax wage income
y. Unemployed workers receive unemployment beneﬁts θy where θ is the replacement
ratio.
Labor supply is inelastic at an individual level. At the aggregate level, labor supply
is determined by moves between the pools of workers (employed and unemployed) ,
entrepreneurs, and retirees. This further strenghtens the role that asset accumulation
plays in the economy. We use aggregate labor input data on the average hours per
worker to calibrate the labor demand. Therefore, the labor market clears implicitly at
the level of the utility function.
After retirement, the household earns income from its savings and pension (which
equals the unemployment beneﬁt payments). Retirees face a probability δ of dying.
They are then replaced by agents with no assets and any remaining assets are lost (no
bequests).
6Once retired, household cannot become productive again. This innocuous assumption simpliﬁes
the calibration of birth rates.
7Kocherlakota (2000) shows how credit constraints are fundamental for the ampliﬁcation of income
shocks at a macroeconomic level when capital and labour shares in production function are substantial.
Our net worth constraint works in a similar manner, but by rationing an endogenous mass of the agent
distribution with positive assets below some m∗.
8Consumption insurance is used in a number of papers, recently in Gertler and Karadi (2011)
5The households make their consumption-savings decision to maximize their expected
lifetime utility. The contemporaneous utility function is a CRRA type:
U(c,l)j =
(lσ
j c1−σ)1−ρ − 1
1 − ρ
,
where j ∈ {W,U,E,R}, l denotes leisure, c consumption, and ρ is a risk-aversion pa-
rameter. As mentioned above, the labor supply is inelastic and the values lj represent
market-clearing values for leisure.
Let Vj denote the value functions and m∗ be the minimum net worth necessary for
external ﬁnancing. A worker with a net worth m < m∗ faces probability (1 − u) of
being employed, following which he receives labor income y = (1 − lW)w and interest
income Rdm, pays a banking fee ξ,9 consumes a desired level, and invests his remaining
net worth m′10 in a bank. If unemployed, he receives unemployment beneﬁt payment
θy and makes a similar consumption-savings decision. In the next period, depending
on the level of m′, a worker may either become an entrepreneur (borrower) or remain a
worker (depositor).
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An entrepreneur i invests in a project of size xi, earns a stochastic net return ri and
labor income y = (1 − lE)w, and pays the borrowing cost rl(xi − mi), while making a
consumption-savings decision to maximize his expected utility. Because the net wealth
is constrained to be non-negative, signiﬁcant project losses may drive the entrepreneur
into bankruptcy. When bankrupt, an entrepreneur defaults on the portion of the debt
9We will justify in the calibration the use of ξ.
10A prime (′) denotes variable values in the next period.
6he cannot repay, less a minimal consumption allowance cmin, which has to be granted
by the bank. Upon default, the entrepreneur starts the next period as a household with
no assets and no liabilities. The returns on project ri are drawn independently across
time and individuals and follow a trinomial distribution. The lowest of the returns is
suﬃciently negative to lead the entrepreneur to bankruptcy. The value function of an



























The assumption that project xi is proportional to the entrepreneur’s asset holdings
mi can be justiﬁed by the collateral requirements typically observed in credit markets.
The proportionality parameter φ can easily be calibrated from the data. We assume
that households ex ante always prefer to apply for a loan. This implies a participation
constraint for households in a productive stage of their lives that needs to be satisﬁed
for all households that obtain a loan:
ErVE(m,r) ≥ (1 − u)VW(m) + uVU(m), ∀m ≥ m
∗. (4)
Every household faces an exogenous probability of retirement τ. Once retired, the









i′ = (1 + r
d)m + yR − ξ,
m
i′ ≥ 0.
Risk-averse agents smooth their consumption over time. Heterogeneous risks of un-
employment and retirement as well as the heterogeneity in project returns cause uncer-
tain income streams and lead to a non-degenerate distribution of assets in the economy.
Without these risks, there would be no reason to save other than to invest in a project,
and the asset distribution would unrealistically collapse along m = 0 and m = m∗. This
would make ﬁnancial intermediation impossible because of the lack of funds (no depos-
itors). Furthermore, as pointed out by Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and R´ ıos-Rull
(2007), there would be no bankruptcy without agent heterogeneity. All equilibria in
7such bimodal distribution are very unstable because all entrepreneurs can drift to zero
assets following a shock. The distribution of assets plays a crucial role in determining
the dynamics of the aggregate variables.
The decision to allocate savings between bank equity and bank deposits is obtained by
maximizing a risk-adjusted return on portfolio r
port













i = re Ei
Mi + rd Di
Mi = ωrire + (1 − ωri)rd, ωri ≡ Ei/Mi is a weight on the
risky (equity) investment for agent type i, λi is a risk-aversion parameter, and σ2
port is
a variance of the portfolio return. Because bank deposits carry no risk (σ2


















e . This in turn deﬁnes the demand








Note that we have separated this portfolio problem from the intertemporal utility
maximization of the household. We do this for computational reasons: given that with
aggregate shocks we need to include the entire asset distribution in the state space, we
need to avoid having to track for each household two separate assets to keep the state
space dimensionality within computationally eﬃcient bounds. Appendix B shows the
details of making savings decisions depend on asset levels.
2.3 Financial Sector
2.3.1 Bank
The representative bank maximizes its expected proﬁts, taking the asset distribution
in the economy as given. Proﬁts equal asset returns less the funding costs, deposit
insurance payments, and the expected loan losses and liquidation costs. The bank’s
choice variables are loans L, bonds B, equity E, and deposits D. Because the bank
takes the distribution of assets as well as all returns as given, the choice of loan volume
is identical to the choice of a threshold level of net worth m∗. Formally, the problem










D − (1 + lc)ǫL + ξ (7)
8subject to




D + E ≥ L, (10)
where M is the total amount of loanable funds that are exogenous from the point of
view of the bank, δ is a per-unit deposit insurance cost parameter, ǫ is an expected
share of loan losses, and lc is a liquidation cost parameter. Equation (8) is the usual
balance sheet constraint, (9) is the regulatory requirement on capital adequacy, and (10)
is a non-negativity constraint on bond holdings. The proﬁt function (7) is non-linear
because of the inclusion of deposit insurance costs, which are an increasing function of
the deposit/equity ratio. Because proﬁts increase with larger loans for any given asset
distribution, one and only one of the constraints (9) and (10) will bind at any time.11
The solution of the proﬁt maximization is described in the appendix.
2.4 Central bank
The central bank in this model determines the bond interest rate rb and supplies govern-
ment bonds at that rate. In addition, it determines the capital-to-asset ratio parameter
α. Therefore α and rb are the only monetary policy instruments it has at hand. In the
simulation in Section 4, we show how diﬀerent monetary policy actions, as represented
by mean-preserving changes in rb across the aggregate states, inﬂuence the behavior of
the diﬀerent types of households and of the representative bank. We also do similar
exercises with mean-preserving changes in the capital requirements.
2.5 Market clearing
On the ﬁnancial side, markets for loans, bonds, equity, and deposits must clear. The
bond market clears automatically because of an inﬁnitely elastic supply of bonds.12 The




















11The chances that both of them bind at the same time can be dismissed as arbitrarily low.
12One can think of banks depositing their non-loanable investments at the central bank, which also





i = D + E = B + L. (14)

















where   are auditing costs.
Equity market clearing implicitly deﬁnes the return on equity re as a function of all
other returns. In the case of an interior solution, equations (21) and (6) imply
1
δ








(re − rd)2 + 2λσ2
e(re − rd) − λ2σ4
e = 0. (15)
In the case of a corner solution, equations (24) and (6) imply
re3 − re2
h
















To illustrate the functioning of the equity market, it is useful to undergo the following
thought experiment. Consider a case of an increase in the lending interest rate rl,
possibly because of an increase in the demand for loans. If the ratio of expected losses
as a proportion of loans ǫ rises less than rl, the bank’s proﬁt margin on the additional
new loan goes up, which prompts the bank to lend more. To do so, the bank has to raise
more equity (it starts without excess equity: E = αL), which is why the equity supply
equation (21) is increasing in the loan proﬁt margin. Household demand for equity (6)
is unaﬀected by the return on loans, and so to raise more equity, the bank’s oﬀered re
has to increase. re plays an important role in the bank’s liability management because
the bond rate is exogenous and determines the deposit rate in an interior solution, and
also because the bank cannot choose the size of its balance sheet M. The increase of
re leads to a rise in the total amount of equity raised and to a more-than-proportional
increase in the E/D ratio for any size of the balance sheet M.13
It is therefore easy to see that when the bank increases the share of loans in its
portfolio, it has to fund the higher equity holdings at an ever-increasing price. Even-
tually, the original proﬁt margin disappears and a new optimal loan level is achieved.
Two cases can occur. First, the total amount of new loans is less than the new balance
sheet level, and loan market clearing conditions are satisﬁed and constitute a potential
equilibrium. Second, the total amount of new loans may exceed the new balance sheet
volume M, which is what we deﬁned earlier as a corner solution. In the latter case the
loan market does not clear and the banks ration some of the eligible loan applicants.
Because there is no asymmetric information problem in this model (hence no adverse
selection), an increase in the price of loans does not aﬀect its quality and a higher rl is
needed to clear the market. Therefore we have a choice of focusing on market-clearing
13This follows from the fact that E
D = ωr
1−ωr and ωr increases in re.
10equilibria, which rule out corner solutions and equity “hoarding”, or allowing credit
rationing when multiple equilibria may arise and excess equity is kept as a backup in
case the total amount of loanable funds M increases. For simplicity, we focus on the
market-clearing equilibria, implying that equation (16) becomes irrelevant. This implies
that we do not observe the bank holding excess equity in equilibrium, and so regulatory
changes in capital adequacy ratio ρ will have a direct eﬀect on the loan volume.
Market-clearing condition (15) deﬁnes a return on equity as a function of all other
returns and some parameters: re=re(rl,rd,σ2
e,λ,α). The cubic equation can be solved
analytically but does not determine the re uniquely. Depending on the parameter values,
two of the three roots may be complex. We disregard the complex roots.
The system is recursive: conditional on M, equation (21) determines the optimal
level of equity E, equation (23) determines the optimal level of deposits D, equation
(14) determines the optimal level of bonds B, and equation (22) determines the optimal
level of loans L. We therefore have {re,rd,E,D,L,B} as a function of {rl,M} and
exogenous variables.
2.6 Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium in this model economy includes the four value functions
Vj(m,s), where s represents the aggregate state (current shock, distribution of m),






policies {α(s),rb(s)}, prices {rd(s),rport(s),re(s)}, aggregate asset levels {L,D,B,E},
and a function Ψ( ) such that
1. decision rules gm
j (m,s) solve each household’s problem with the associated value
functions Vj(m,s).
2. decision rules gd
M(s) and ge
M(s) solve portfolio problem of the household.
3. decision rules gm∗
B (s) and grl
B(s) solve the banks’ problems.


























To simulate the economy and obtain numerical results, we parametrize the model to the
Canadian economy in the years of 1988 to 1992, in accordance with the available data
on project return distributions. Indeed, these are the only years for which Statistics
Canada published such data.
First we calibrate the household sector. Several parameters are set in accordance with
the literature: ρ = 2.5, β = 0.96, and σ = 0.67. In accordance with the models that
include explicit leisure speciﬁcation, lE = lW = lU = 0.55 while lR=1, as a result of which
the labor input of entrepreneurs and workers, and the search eﬀort of unemployed are set
to 0.45. Wages are exogenous and while they completely characterize the labor income
of entrepreneurs and workers, the incomes of unemployed and retired are determined by
the ratio of unemployment insurance beneﬁts to wages θ = 0.3.14
The probability of unemployment is set equal to the average Canadian unemployment
rate for the considered period: u = 0.0924. The probability of retirement τ and the
mortality rate δ are set at 0.05 and 0.1, respectively so that the number of expected
periods as a worker is 20 and as a retiree is 10. Longer expected lifetime horizon generates
a stronger wealth eﬀect, and consequently stronger responses of savings over time than
in the usual 2-period models (e.g., Williamson (1987) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989)).
Now we turn to the ﬁnancial side. Following the calibration in Yuan and Zimmer-
mann (2004), we set the real bond rate rb at 1%, such that the deposit rate rd is about
0.9%, which corresponds to an average of savings rates and guaranteed investment cer-
tiﬁcate rates. The parameter α of the capital adequacy constraint is taken to represent
the tier-1 capital requirements imposed by the 1998 Basel Accord and set to α = 0.08.
The deposit insurance parameter δ is calibrated using the premium rates of the Canadian
Deposit Insurance Corporation for banks in 2000/2001 (0.0417% of insured deposits).
This per-unit rate corresponds to δ = 0.0000417 for an average D/E ratio of 10. The
loan administration cost lc is assumed to equal 0. The account ﬂat fee ξ is set at 0.0003
by trial and error in order to get the banks to break even. The parameters of the equity
market that need to be calibrated are λ and σ2
E. The variance of returns on equity of the
banks is calculated from the TSE (Toronto Stock Exchange) monthly series on ﬁnancial
enterprises’ returns on equity from September 1978 until December 2000, which are de-
ﬂated by the CPI. Therefore, σ2
E = 0.24. The risk-aversion parameter of the portfolio
optimization problem λ is calibrated from the market-clearing condition (15) using the
observed average real deposit, lending and ROE rates. This implies λ = 16.
The distribution of returns follows a two-state Markov process calibrated such that
the high state occurs 75% of the time. Speciﬁcally, a high state has a 75% chance of
reoccuring the next period, while a low state can repeat itself with a 25% chance. The
distributions of project returns in both aggregate states are calibrated from ﬁrms’ return
on equity data. Statistics Canada (1994) reports the distribution of return on equity by
non-ﬁnancial enterprises from the fourth quarter of 1988 until the fourth quarter of 1992.
14This measure is based on the eﬀective replacement rate of Hornstein and Yuan (1999).
12Average returns in each quarter are reported for the top, middle, and bottom tertile.
Assuming the underlying distribution is normal, we ﬁnd the returns and associated
probabilities for trinomial distributions such that a) average returns are replicated, and
b) we have have two extreme returns, one implying bankruptcy. We compute two such
distributions, one for the high aggregate state, corresponding to the average of the 75%
best quarters in the sample period, and the other for the low state. The returns and the











The ratio of investment to net worth (φ−1) is calibrated to equal the average debt-
equity ratio during the reference period, and so φ = 2.2. With a minimum return on
investment of -50%, we have occasional bankruptcies.
4 Capital requirements, bank lending, and mone-
tary policy
In this section, we want to understand the behavior of the model economy. This is no
easy task, as the model is quite complex. The rich aggregate state space implies that
many diﬀerent histories of shocks can be studied. We focus here on one particular history
which we believe is empirically relevant from the business cycle perspective. The model
economy has been hit by a long sequence of High aggregate shocks, thus the distribution
of assets has converged to a high steady state. Given the way the shock process has
been calibrated, the economy spends on average 50% of time in the initial state of this
experiment, a state that we will sometimes refer to as “normal times.” Our experiment
then starts with a succession of ﬁve low shocks and then ﬁve high shocks. Thus, the
model economy wanders through a whole cycle, bottoming out in the middle. Note that
this is a particular history of shocks among many others and that this history is not
anticipated.
Figure 1 shows the behavior of various indicators in a benchmark economy, i.e., one
with no policy intervention from the central bank on the interest rate for bonds or capital
requirements. When the initial bad shock hits the economy, the lending rate jumps up,
essentially to cover against higher expected loan losses, and because agents need time to
adjust their asset holdings. As the bad news (negative shocks) accumulate, the lending
rate decreases as m∗ increases and the households adjust their asset levels. Banks ration
more and more loans as bad shocks accumulate but revert to “normal” behavior as
soon as good news comes in. From peak to trough, the amount of loans decreases by
3.0%, and 3.6% of all entrepreneurs are driven out. The consequence is that the size
of an average loan increases by 0.6%, which corresponds to the empirically documented
phenomenon that small businesses suﬀer more in a downturn.
13Do the results of the benchmark calibration imply a credit crunch? Despite the
fact that banks can increase the interest rate on loans to compensate for higher default
rates, they have to decrease the total loan mass. The reason is the following. Facing
increased risk, more entrepreneurs are forced to become workers because of a higher
bankruptcy rate. With more agents that save, the volume of assets increases. However,
a smaller share of those assets are channeled to bank equity because its return is too
low given its risk. The banks are then squeezed by the capital requirement and have to
ration credit and invest more into less proﬁtable government bonds. Without the capital
requirement, banks could make more loans, in principle, by charging even higher loan
rates, and entrepreneurs would still be willing to pay these rates. Although all agents
behave optimally, we have a situation that can be described as a credit crunch to the
extent that the marginal returns and the marginal costs of loans are not equal.
Capital requirements imply that changes in the compostition of banks’ liabilities
aﬀect the amount of credit in the economy. An adverse productivity shock increases the
number of depositors and lowers the number of borrowers. Yet risk averse depositors
shy away from the risky bank equity, which leads to a further credit decline (due to the
binding capital requirements). Thus, our unique heterogeneous agents setup generates
“procyclical” bank capital requirements even without α dependant on risk.15 However,
the movements described above are relatively small.
4.1 Countercyclical monetary policy
The following experiments explain the consequences of various policy actions. The ﬁrst
policy experiment, described in Figure 2, involves a 25-basis-point reduction of the bond
rate in the worst aggregate state (current shock Low, long history of Low shocks).16
Thus, the central bank reacts only after a prolonged decline in the economy. Note that
the decisions of the banks are changed only in this speciﬁc state: m∗ and the lending
rates are unaﬀected when the central bank does not move, but when it does banks reduce
the lending rate by the same margin and, more importantly, signiﬁcantly relax their loan
threshold m∗. Thus the situation for entrepreneurs should improve noticeably: easier
access to credit at better conditions. Loan activity is negatively aﬀected, however, and
equity is reduced compared with the benchmark. This is because workers decide to save
less (interest rates are lower) and put a smaller fraction of their saving into equity (the
return of equity drops more). Note that household decisions are aﬀected even when
the central bank has left the bond rate untouched, in anticipation of possible changes.
Ultimately, the same number of entrepreneurs get loans and the average loan is now
smaller.
A one-time drop in the interest rate therefore does not appear to be an eﬀective
policy, as it weakly magniﬁes the credit cycle rather than smoothing it. What now if
15The recent literature described above discusses how procyclical bank capital requirements arise in
the scope of Basel II. Yet in our model, banks eﬀectively operate under Basel I.
16Note that all experiments are designed such that the average rb or m∗ stay at the same level.
14the interest rate is gradually reduced by 5 points after each bad shock and goes back
to normal whenever a good shock comes by? This policy should better reﬂect the
expectations households formulate and consequently yield a stronger wealth eﬀect. In
Figure 3, we see that the outcome is quite diﬀerent from Figure 2. Equity-rich banks are
more generous to entrepreneurs in bad times, both in terms of lower lending rates in bad
times (but higher in good ones) and quite signiﬁcantly in terms of m∗. In all aggregate
states, there are more entrepreneurs, loans, deposits, and equity. While the average loan
is larger in normal times compared with the benchmark, it is smaller in almost any other.
This means that asset accumulation has increased for households: entrepreneurship is
more interesting as monetary policy counterbalances the increased risk in bad times.
This eﬀect is facilitated by an increasing spread, which makes investment of households
into bank equity more attractive. Indeed, while ﬁrms face lower average returns and
higher bankruptcy rates, monetary policy forces banks to oﬀer better conditions. This
has an impact on asset accumulation even in good times, due to the households’ long
planning horizon. We conclude that an active countercyclical monetary policy can have
a signiﬁcant positive impact. Note, however, that it cannot remove the cyclical nature
of loans.
4.2 Procyclical monetary policy
If a policy of lower interest rates may have negative consequences under some circum-
stances, one may naturally ask whether an interest rate increase can do some good.
Indeed, higher bond rates mean higher returns on savings and potentially more equity
to satisfy the loan needs in the presence of capital requirements.
In Figure 4, we ﬁnd that the model economy does not behave in a symmetric way,
as compared with Figure 2. While the lending rate increases as expected, m∗ barely
changes. Consequently, the loan activity does not change much as households barely
change their decisions compared with the benchmark. The average loan size decreases.
However, the change in the average loan size is smaller than in the countercyclical policy.
Figure 5 shows the model equilibrium when interest rates are increased gradually.
The asymmetry of the monetary policy observed in Figure 3 is also present for the
gradual policy. A gradual increase of the bond rate has a negative, but much smaller
impact on the various assets. The asymmetry of monetary policy due to the existence
of credit constraints has been highlighted by Kocherlakota (2000). In our model, the
explanation for this asymmetry is as follows. Countercyclical monetary policy induces a
drop in m∗, leading to an increase in the loan volume as more smaller agents can become
entrepreneurs. Moreover, a lower m∗ induces workers to save more (consumption drops)
at any given deposit rate because entrepreneurship is more likely to be attained (a move
that is slightly oﬀset by the distributional movement from workers to entrepreneurs).
Because of this boom in banks’ liabilities, the asset side of bank’s balance sheets expands
which reinforces the initial loan volume increase.
On the other hand, a gradual procyclical monetary policy induces a small rise in m∗.
15This is a strong saving disincentive for workers who want to become entrepreneurs and
leads to a drop in the volume of deposits and equity. Such a drop is oﬀset by a larger
increase of the pool of depositors and a rise in the deposit interest rate. Because of these
oﬀsetting eﬀects, the change in the volume and the composition of the banks’ balance
sheets is relatively small.
The reason why the oﬀsetting distributional eﬀect is stronger when m∗ rises is that
the distribution of agents is skewed in the neighborhood of m∗. Households have little
reason to attain an asset level just below m∗ because of a higher expected utility of an
entrepreneur than of a worker. Thus, an increase in m∗ has stronger consequences on
loans than a decrease. This explains why m∗ does not have to rise as much as it had to
decline.
Finally, banks’ decisions to change m∗ in an asymmetric way is just a reﬂection of the
equilibrium nature of the problem. With a countercyclical monetary policy, in order for
banks to give more loans, a rise in their equity funding is required (capital requirements
bind). Yet the equity is more risky in bad states and households channel their savings
away from equity and into deposits. Therefore, in order to expand their loans, banks
must make the vision of entrepreneurship – a motivation for saving – more desirable.
This is why m∗ drops sharply. On the contrary, a procyclical monetary policy achieves
a loan volume drop by an increase in m∗. Such increase can be small because, for any
amount of savings, risk-averse households prefer deposits in bad times anyway.
4.3 Countercyclical capital requirements
The interest rate is one of two instruments the central bank can use. The other is to
modify the capital requirements, which in the benchmark economy are set at an 8%
equity/loan ratio, as in the original Basle Accord. We now explore the policy of cyclical
changes in capital requirements. In the ﬁrst experiment (see Figure 6), equity/loan ratio
is lowered to 7% in the worst aggregate state. This has two eﬀects. First, it facilitates
bank lending in the worst state. Second, households shift from equity to deposits because
of the increased risk. The second eﬀect is suﬃciently large to counterbalance the ﬁrst,
resulting in a decrease of the loan volume. As in the case of a bond rate reduction,
the average loan size decreases as the number of entrepreneurs barely changes compared
with the benchmark economy.
The next experiment involves a gradual decline of the capital requirements during
the bad shocks (see Figure 7). One would expect that the regulator allowing the banks
to take more risks during a downturn may generate more loans. To the contrary, equity
declines even more, resulting in a smaller loan mass under a binding regulatory con-
straint. Interestingly, loans are lower even when the regulator does not intervene and
has in fact slightly more stringent capital requirements to maintain the same average as
in the benchmark. The reasons are the same as previously: households shy away from
banks when they take on more risk.
164.4 Procyclical capital requirements
If countercyclical capital requirements have adverse eﬀects, maybe procyclical ones have
a positive impact on lending ability. Figure 8 looks at the one-time policy, and Figure 9
at the gradual one. Both policies have positive eﬀects: small local eﬀects in the ﬁrst case,
and large global eﬀects in the second case. Thus, tightening of the capital requirements is
good for loan activity because it improves the ﬁnancing of the banks. An increase in the
equity-deposit spread facilitates the portfolio reallocation of households from deposits
to equity. The lending rate increases in both the one-time and the gradual scenarios, to
oﬀset higher equity costs. In the gradual scenario, higher loan volume is facilitated by a
drop in m∗. This brings in more entrepreneurs, both directly (those that were just below
m∗ before its drop) and indirectly by increasing saving as entrepreneurship becomes more
achievable to a wider spectrum of households (hence the increase in deposits as well as
equity). These smaller new loans result in a lower average loan size under this policy.
Although this policy eﬀectively mimics the Basel Accord II requirement of higher
capital requirements in a downturn, its eﬀects on the model economy contrast sharply
with those described in the literature (see Section 1). In the literature, the negative eﬀect
of tightening requirements in a downturn is a result of a demand-side argument where
higher capital raising costs further contract banks’ lending. However, such argument
ignores the eﬀect of more stringent capital requirements on the supply of bank capital.
In our model, this latter eﬀect dominates and stringent capital requirements improve
bank funding. Well-capitalized banks are more attractive to savers. Furthermore, the
loan volume increases as a result of lending to previously ineligible borrowers (those with
net worth just below initial m∗), providing further incentive to save - a welcome news
for banks in need of funding.
Note that we have no informational problem in the model economy that would ac-
tually require the imposition of capital requirements. One can easily imagine that if
the model would include this feature, it would only reinforce the result: the presence of
more entrepreneurial risk leads to a higher impact of asymmetric information and risk,
thus furthering the need for regulation.
4.5 Credit crunch? What exactly happens in the model?
A negative aggregate shock lowers the expected project returns and increases their
volatility. This aﬀects the loan volume and the lending rate in four ways. First, both
these eﬀects decrease the expected value of risk-averse entrepreneurs (ErVE) while the
value functions of non-entrepreneurial households do not see a ﬁrst-order eﬀect.17 There-
fore the incentive to accumulate assets in order to be eligible for a loan declines. This
lowers the quantity demanded for credit because fewer agents save enough to pass the m∗
cutoﬀ. Second, the risk-neutral banks care only about the expected return of projects.
The relative net payoﬀ of bonds versus loans rises and induces a substitution from loans
17There is a second order eﬀect coming from expectations to be an entrepreneur in the future.
17to bonds. The loan supply drops and the lending rate rL increases to compensate for
higher loan losses. This is the credit supply eﬀect (i.e., the “crunch”). Third, an increase
in rL further discourages loan applicants because their net return on investment declines,
and the equilibrium credit level drops further. Therefore the post-shock equilibrium ex-
hibits a higher lending rate and a lower level of loans which further propagates the shock.
Note that the decline in the market-clearing volume of credit is partly demand-driven
and cannot be attributed to only the credit crunch behavior of the banks. Fourth, the
household perceives more risk in the bank when entrepreneurial risk increases. It then
shifts from equity to insured deposits, thus making it harder for banks to meet the
capital requirements. They further reduce the supply of loans.
4.6 Does the equity market worsen or soften the credit decline?
The existence of an equity market can either amplify or reduce the impact of a nega-
tive shock on a volume of credit. Only the second and fourth of the above mentioned
four eﬀects is directly aﬀected by the existence of an equity market. The equilibrium
condition (15) shows that only changes in rL and ǫ aﬀect credit behavior through the
equity channel, and they do so in an oﬀsetting manner. An increase in ǫ (higher loan
losses) increases the return on equity rE, while an increase in rL lowers it. We therefore
distinguish two cases. (A) If d
￿
rL − (1 + lc
￿
ǫ) < 0, then a rise in rE increases the cost
of funds to the bank, which squeezes the proﬁt margin further and leads to an additional
substitution from loans to bonds (LS drops) as well as an increase in rL. At the same
time the portfolio return rPORT increases, making borrowing relatively less attractive
(demand for credit drops). In this case, the presence of the equity market worsens the
credit decline: a higher rE is compatible only with a lower amount of equity E on the
market, as households are risk averse while banks are risk neutral, which in turn requires
an additional drop in loans due to a binding capital adequacy constraint (see equation
(22)). Case (B) when d(rL − (1 + lc)ǫ) > 0 has the opposite implication – it softens the
eﬀects of the ﬁnancial accelerator. According to the simulations (comparing peak and
trough states), d(rL − (1 + lc)ǫ) = 0.0002 and we can conclude that the presence of the
equity market softens the credit crunch.
5 Conclusion
We used a complex model to study the interaction of household saving decisions, project
returns, Basel Accord type banking regulation, and credit activity. We ﬁnd that the
Basel Accord has a noticeable impact on loans when project returns decline through the
cycle. Active monetary policy through interest rate reductions in bad times is able to
increase the loan volume, but without removing its cyclical nature.
A relaxation of the Basel Accord capital requirements in bad times obtains negative
results, as households shy away from the equity that banks need to make loans. As
in models with informational problems, which do not explicitly exist in our model, a
18tightening is in order. Therefore, this calls for regulatory policy to be active through the
cycle, in the sense of the Basel Accord II, which forces banks to adopt a risk evaluation
method ` a la Merton, as pointed out by Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, and Tsomocos (2005).
Our results also emphasized that it is important to take into account the ﬁnancing of
banks. Given capital requirements, banks are limited in their lending by the bank equity
that households are willing to hold. As this decision is inﬂuenced by interest rates, it
gives rise to another channel of monetary policy. This channel has also been identiﬁed
by Chami and Cosimano (2010) and van der Heuvel (2008). Unlike these papers, we do
not require explicit asymmetric information, market power in the banking industry, or
the increasing marginal cost of ﬁnancing.
A Appendix: Solving the banks’ problem
Due to the inequality constraints, we have to use a Kuhn-Tucker approach and be careful









D − (1 + lc)ǫL
+λ1(D + E − B − L) + λ2(E/L − α) + λ3(D + E − L).
Then the ﬁrst-order conditions are
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l − λ1 − λ2E/L
2 − λ3 − ǫ(1 + lc) = 0
r
b − λ1 = 0
−r










+ λ1 + λ2/L + λ3 = 0.
As noted above, there are two possibilities: either constraint (9) or constraint (10) bind.
In terms of the Lagrangean we therefore need to consider two cases. The one where
λ2 > 0 and λ3 = 0 (i.e., (9) binds while (10) does not) will be referred to as an “interior
solution” because not all loanable funds are invested into loans. The opposite case where
λ3 > 0 and λ2 = 0 will be referred to as a “corner solution.” For simplicity, in what
follows we assume γ = 1.
Interior solution
This is the case when bank holds just enough equity to satisfy the capital adequacy



























D = M − E, (23)
where (21) is an equity (or implicitly deposit) supply equation. Conditional on particular
values of M and all levels of prices, equations (20) to (23) form a recursive system which
uniquely determines all quantities.
Corner solution
In a corner solution, bank holds more equity than required by the capital adequacy
requirement (D + E = L and therefore E/L > α). Now, rb > rd 18, and the above








L = M (25)
D = M − E (26)
r
l − r
b − (1 + lc)ǫ = r
b − r
d. (27)
where (24) is again an equity supply equation. Note that now loans and equity supply
decisions are disconnected. Equation (27) shows a wedge between the bond and deposit
rates. The bond “premium” on the right hand side equals the proﬁt diﬀerential between
net returns on loans and bonds that would equal zero in an interior solution.
B Appendix: Portfolio optimization









Because returns on equity are uncertain, the covariance between expected gross re-
turn and expected marginal utility at t + 1 aﬀects consumption decisions of households
in equilibrium. The intuition is easy to see if we think of starting from certain returns
on equity and then allow for uncertainty with cov>0 – returns on equity tend to be
high when MU of consumption is high. Such change makes allocations under certainty
suboptimal because MUt < PV (EtMUt+1). An inter-temporal re-allocation by shifting
consumption from today to the future period increases MUt and lowers MUt+1 which
brings Euler equation into balance. So when comovement between MU and Re is posi-
tive – an empirical regularity, see Duﬀee (2005) – households save more through equity
than through deposits with the same return (Rd is certain). A non-zero covariance
justiﬁes existence of two assets in equilibrium.
18A lower demand for bank’s ﬁnancing by deposits (relative to equity) depresses their price.
20This implies diﬀerences in saving patterns across heterogeneous agents arising from
diﬀerences in their expected income (and consumption) levels. On average, entrepreneurs
earn most, workers less, and unemployed and retirees least of all. With increasing and
concave utility MUworker < MUretired < MUunemployed.19 If cov(MU,Re) is a constant
wedge, the last Euler equation above implies that covariance between Re and C will be
least important for agents with highest average MU (unemployed) and most important
for workers because of their low MU. Then, workers will save most through the equity
while unemployed will save least via equity, because the comovement of risky returns is
relatively less important when MU is high.
To implement this idea in the scope of our model, we introduce three mutual funds
for each of the three types of depositors: workers, unemployed and retirees. Equation
(6) show that choices of workers, unemployed and retirees of share of risky equity in
their portfolio saving depends on their risk aversion parameter λi. Guided by the above
discussion and standard micro theory we calibrate λi as proportional to the distance
Xi between utility of mean consumption U(Ci) and average of utilities U(Ci − T) and
U(Ci+T) where T is chosen to clear equity market (EW +EU+ER = E). Speciﬁcally for







M/λ where λ is
the aggregate lambda implied by the overall market’s equity holdings (the homogeneous
part of the model), Mi is overall asset holding of agent type i.
C Appendix: The solution procedure
Heterogeneous agents models with aggregate shocks are diﬃcult to solve because the
distribution of agents is not invariant and becomes a highly dimensional state variable.
The two main strategies to solve this problem is to either ﬁnd a good way to summarize
the distribution with very few variables, as Krusell and Smith (1998) demonstrate, or
to work with linearization, as Cooley and Quadrini (2006) do. Unfortunately, neither is
possible here due to some highly non-linear phenomena that are crucial in our model.
For example, decision rules change abruptly in the vicinity of m∗. Finally, second degree
eﬀects appear to be quite important, and they are likely to vanish with linearization.
Our strategy uses the realization that aggregate shocks in a two-state Markov pro-
cess lead to transitional states somewhere between two steady-states corresponding to
repeated identical shocks. We therefore choose a suﬃcient number of aggregate states
to represent a large proportion of actual aggregate states.
The aggregate state space is assumed two-dimensional: one dimension is the current
shock, high or low, the other is a counter of how far from the the high steady-state
the economy is. Speciﬁcally, this counter is incremented by one each time a low shocks
occurred in the previous period, or decreased by one if a high shock occurred. The
minimum counter value is one, the maximum is chosen such that this state occurs
19Retirees have a lot of free time.
21infrequently. We choose a maximum of 5, implying with the transition probabilities of




50.2 16.7 5.6 1.9 0.6
16.7 5.6 1.9 0.6 0.2
!
.
We then solve this model economy with the standard tools for heterogeneous agent
economies, that is value function iterations followed by iterations on the invariant distri-
bution (deﬁned over the aggregate states as well). The equilibrium is reached by ﬁnding
the set of lending rates rl and loan eligibility rules m∗ that balance all markets and
satisfy all constraints in all aggregate states.
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24D Figures
Figure 1: Benchmark economy as it cycles through all possible aggregate states
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25Figure 2: Benchmark and policy with interest rate reduction in worst case only
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26Figure 3: Benchmark and policy with gradual interest rate reduction in bad return
situations
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27Figure 4: Benchmark and policy with interest rate increase in worst case only
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28Figure 5: Benchmark and policy with gradual interest rate increase as aggregate states
worsen
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29Figure 6: Benchmark and policy with relaxing of capital requirements in worst case only
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30Figure 7: Benchmark and policy with gradual relaxing of capital requirements as aggre-
gate states worsen
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31Figure 8: Benchmark and policy with tightening of capital requirements in worst case
only
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32Figure 9: Benchmark and policy with gradual tightening of capital requirements as
aggregate states worsen
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